

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 108130

53

ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/RPM:EJSTREATOR:GP
APPROVED BY D: THE ACTING SECRETARY
EUR:AAHARTMAN
C:HSonnenfeldt
S/S: WHLUERS

----- 014657

P R 231705Z MAY 74 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USINT DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

S E C R E T STATE 108130

EXDIS/TOSEC 948 - ZFF5 DAMASCUS AND JERUSALEM ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: SYG LUNS' CONVERSATION WITH THE ACTING SECRETARY

1. SYG LUNS MET WITH THE ACTING SECRETARY MAY 20 FOR GENERAL DISCUSSION, WHICH TOUCHED ON THE FRENCH ELECTIONS, THE SITUATION IN ICELAND, YUGOSLAVIA, GREECE, PORTUGAL, THE FORTHCOMING NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, SALT, MBFR AND CSCE. LUNS WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ASYG KASTL AND OTHERS OF HIS STAFF. AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD, COUNSELOR SONNENFELDT AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN WERE ALSO PRESENT.

2. FRENCH ELECTIONS. LUNS EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION ON GISCARD'S ELECTION, INDICATING IT WOULD HAVE BEEN "DISASTROUS" IF MITTERAND HAD WON, SINCE THE INCLUSION OF COMMUNIST MINISTERS IN THE FRENCH CABINET WOULD HAVE RAISED SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH RESPECT TO FRENCH ACCESS
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 108130

TO NATO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

3. ICELAND. THE ACTING SECRETARY TOLD LUNS THAT WE HAD BEEN INVITED BY THE ICELANDERS TO PUT OFF FOR A TIME THE

MATTER OF THE BASE NEGOTIATIONS. LUNS SAID HE BELIEVED THE ATTITUDE OF THE ICELANDIC POPULATION TOWARD NATO HAD MUCH IMPROVED SINCE THE END OF THE COD WAR, AS REFLECTED IN THE "ICELAND DEFENDED" PETITION SIGNED BY 50,000.

4. BEGIN FYI ONLY. YUGOSLAVIA. LUNS REPORTED THAT

VARIOUS ALLIES ARE CONCERNED ABOUT POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA. SOME, HE SAID, BELIEVE THE SOVIETS WILL INTERVENE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. HE REFERRED TO SECRETARY RUSK'S STATEMENT IN 1968 THAT THE US WOULD NOT BE INDIFFERENT TO DEVELOPMENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA, AND SAID THAT RECENTLY FRG DEFENSE MINISTER LEBER HAS URGED LUNS TO TAKE STEPS TO SEIZE NATO WITH THE YUGOSLAV ISSUE.

5. RECALLING HIS RECENT INFORMAL AND PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH THE US AND FRG PERMREPS AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES, LUNS SAID HE HAD ASKED FOR A MILITARY ANALYSIS OF THE YUGOSLAV SITUATION FOR HIS PERSONAL INFORMATION. MOREOVER, HE SUGGESTED THE US MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER PRIVATELY INDICATING TO THE SOVIETS CONCERN ABOUT ANY MOVES INVOLVING YUGOSLAVIA. IN A RECENT VISIT TO ITALY, HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE READINESS OF FORCES IN NORTHERN ITALY, BUT HE WAS EQUALLY IMPRESSED BY ITALIAN FEARS ABOUT THE SPEED WITH WHICH EASTERN FORCES COULD ADVANCE TO THE GALICIA PASS, AND ACROSS AUSTRIA. IT SEEMED LOGICAL TO LUNS FOR THE ALLIES TO CONSIDER WAYS OF SUSTAINING YUGOSLAVIA. IF YUGOSLAVIA FELL QUICKLY, THE ALLIES WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO HELP; BUT IF YUGOSLAV GUERRILLAS MOUNTED A HOLDING OPERATION, CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO SUPPORTING THEM. HE SAID HE PLANNED TO RAISE THIS ISSUE ALSO WITH SECRETARY SCHLESINGER.

6. THE ACTING SECRETARY QUESTIONED THE ADVISABILITY OF UNDERTAKING NATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON YUGOSLAVIA THAT COULD LEAK. LUNS SAID THAT HE ENVISAGED RATHER THAT THE SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 108130

ALLIES SHOULD PREPARE ASSESSMENTS OF THE SITUATION. FOR EXAMPLE, INFORMATION ON YUGOSLAVIAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES WOULD BE USEFUL. HARTMAN AGREED ON THE VALUE OF DEVELOPING ASSESSMENTS IN NATO. SONNENFELDT ADDED THAT CONTINGENCY STUDIES ON YUGOSLAVIA OVER THE YEARS HAVE SHOWN VERY FEW EFFECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES THAT COULD BE TAKEN. MOREOVER, WHEN THE ITALIANS REALIZED THE LIMITATIONS ON COUNTERMEASURES, IT WOULD HIGHLIGHT THEIR VULNERABILITY, AND THUS HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT. LUNS SAID A MASSIVE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN YUGOSLAVIA WOULD BE A PROLOGUE TO A THIRD WORLD WAR, AND KASTL REITERATED LUNS' SUGGESTION THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO CONVEY TO THE SOVIETS THE US VIEW THAT AN ACTIVE SOVIET ROLE IN

YUGOSLAVIA WOULD PUT THE WHOLE STRUCTURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AT STAKE.

7. THE ACTING SECRETARY SAID THAT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF INHIBITIONS ON THE SOVIETS. THEY ARE MOVING TOWARD RECOGNITION OF THE INVOLABILITY OF FRONTIERS. MOREOVER,

THEY SEEK ACCESS TO WESTERN CREDITS AND TECHNOLOGY, AND ARE PURSUING MBFR AS A MEANS TO LIMIT TROOPS IN THE FRG. ADVANCES IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS WOULD LIKELY DISCOURAGE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN YUGOSLAVIA. COMMENTING ON LUNS' COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN SITUATION IN 1968 AND THAT IN YUGOSLAVIA, THE ACTING SECRETARY INDICATED THE TWO SITUATIONS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT. HAD THE SOVIETS FAILED TO INTERVENE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THEIR EMPIRE WOULD HAVE CRUMBLLED. IN LUNS' VIEW, IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN USEFUL IF THE WEST HAD INDICATED BEFOREHAND TO THE SOVIETS THE ADVERSE EFFECT OF THE CZECH INVASION, AND HE UNDERLINED ONCE AGAIN HIS VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EARLIER WARNING ISSUED BY SECRETARY RUSK. END FYI ONLY.

8. GREECE. LUNS SAID THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT HAS FAR LESS POPULAR SUPPORT THAN THAT OF PAPADOPOULOS. THE ACTING SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT TRENDS IN GREECE HAVE TENDED TO REDUCE ITS MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS AND THUS ITS CONTRIBUTION TO NATO. IN RESPONSE TO LUNS' QUESTION, HE SAID WE WERE NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE SITUATION IN GREECE.

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 108130

9. PORTUGAL. LUNS VIEWED THE DEVELOPMENTS IN PORTUGAL AS A BAD OMEN, AND SONNENFELDT SAID THAT WE, TOO, ARE QUEASY ABOUT THE SITUATION THERE. THE ACTING SECRETARY FEARED DIFFICULTIES ARE ONLY BEGINNING IN PORTUGAL, WHERE MANY FACTORS ARE FOMENTING INSTABILITY.

10. OTTAWA MINISTERIAL MEETING. LUNS RECALLED THAT PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU PLANNED TO HOLD A DINNER FOR MINISTERS ONLY ON JUNE 17, THE EVE OF THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, AND SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR MINISTERS TO BE ACCOMPANIED AT LEAST BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES. IN THE ENSUING DISCUSSION, IT WAS AGREED THAT ATTENTION WILL BE GIVEN TO THIS ISSUE, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF APPROACHING THE CANADIANS TO SUGGEST THAT THE GUEST LIST BE EXPANDED. IN RESPONSE TO LUNS' QUERY AS TO WHETHER IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A PRIVATE SESSION OF MINISTERS DURING THE MEETING, IT WAS INDICATED THAT THIS ASPECT WOULD NEED TO BE PUT TO THE SECRETARY.

11. SALT. IN RESPONSE TO LUNS' QUERY, THE ACTING SECRETARY DESCRIBED GENERALLY THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS,

AND UNDERLINED THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE US POSITION ON FBS.

12. MBFR. THE ACTING SECRETARY SAID THE SOVIETS CLEARLY ARE INTERESTED IN PROCEEDING WITH MBFR. AFTER OUTLINING

THE CURRENT US POSITION AS REFLECTED IN DISCUSSIONS AT NATO, HE SAID THAT THE US SEES NO GREAT URGENCY, AND THAT OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO REACH AN MBFR AGREEMENT THAT DOES NOT WEAKEN THE WEST. LUNS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP, AND THE ACTING SECRETARY STRESSED THAT THE WEST CONTINUES STRONGER IN TERMS OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS. IN RESPONSE TO LUNS' COMMENTS ON SOVIET SUBMARINE FORCES, SONNENFELDT SAID THAT THE SOVIET MIRV PROGRAM FOR SEA-BASED SYSTEMS LAGS WELL BEHIND OURS.

13. KASTL ASKED FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF US DOMESTIC PRESSURES FOR AN EARLY MBFR AGREEMENT, AND THE ACTING SECRETARY

PAGE 05 STATE 108130

TARY RESPONDED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION FACES CONTINUING PRESSURES FOR TROOP REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE. FOR EXAMPLE, SENATOR MANSFIELD BELIEVES THAT THE US, AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, SHOULD NOT HAVE BASES OVERSEAS AND OTHERS IN CONGRESS BELIEVE THAT IF WE DISARM, THE SOVIETS WILL DO LIKEWISE. IN ANY CASE, HE SAID, IN MANY WAYS THE PRESSURES FAVORING REDUCTIONS WILL NOT BE ALLEVIATED BY MBFR, BUT MBFR IS USEFUL NONETHELESS IN PERSUADING SOME IN CONGRESS TO OPPOSE LEGISLATION CALLING FOR UNILATERAL US REDUCTIONS. THE ACTING SECRETARY AGREED WITH HARTMAN THAT MBFR HAS BEEN HELPFUL IN DEFUSING MANSFIELD'S EFFORTS. THE ADMINISTRATION IS NOT, HOWEVER, UNDER PRESSURE TO CONCLUDE MBFR, THE ACTING SECRETARY SAID, BUT SOME PROGRESS IN THE TALKS NEEDS TO BE SHOWN. REGARDING CURRENT PROPOSALS IN CONGRESS FOR REDUCTIONS ON THE ORDER OF 100,000 US TROOPS WORLD-WIDE, HE SAID THAT THIS WOULD INEVITABLY INVOLVE NATO CUTS. HOWEVER, HE ANTICIPATED THAT LEGISLATION CALLING FOR SUCH HEAVY CUTS WOULD BE VETOED AND THAT THIS CONGRESS WOULD NOT OVERRIDE THE VETO. RUMSFELD ANTICIPATED A CONTINUING SERIES OF AMENDMENTS CALLING FOR REDUCTIONS. THE ACTING SECRETARY SAID THAT THE US DOES NOT VIEW DETENTE AS LEADING TO A SHIFT IN IDEOLOGIES, BUT TO THE RECOGNITION THAT THE TWO SIDES MUST CONTINUE TALKING. LUNS REMARKED THAT HE WAS DEEPLY IMPRESSED BY THE STRENGTH OF US INSTITUTIONS AS CONTRASTED WITH THOSE IN EUROPE, WHERE HEAVY PRESSURES ARE TENDING TO UNDERMINE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR GOVERNMENT AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS.

14. CSCE. HARTMAN SAID THAT THE SOVIETS CLEARLY SEEK RESULTS IN CSCE, BUT THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO DEFINE A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME FROM THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW. THE

US HAS BEEN SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE CONFERENCE FROM THE
OUTSET AND OUR SIGHTS HAVE NOT BEEN AS HIGH AS THOSE OF
OTHERS. HE BELIEVED THE ALLIES MUST AVOID THE APPEARANCE
OF DISUNITY, BUT WONDERED HOW IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR
THE ALLIES TO DEFINE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME ON A UNANIMOUS

BASIS. LUNS BELIEVED THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO
ACHIEVE AGREEMENT IN NAC ON BROAD FORMULAS FOR CSCE
BASKET 3. KASTL REMARKED THAT WHEN THE US HAD RAISED
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 108130

THIS ISSUE IN FEBRUARY, OTHERS HAD FEARED THAT DEFINING
SATISFACTORY RESULTS IN BASKET 3 WOULD AMOUNT TO DEFINING
FINAL FALLBACK POSITIONS, WHICH WAS UNDESIRABLE. RUMSFELD
RECALLED THAT THE CANADIANS HAD INDICATED THAT NON-CSCE
FACTORS COULD AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE ITSELF.
KASTL AGREED THAT ALL ALLIES APPEAR TO RECOGNIZE THAT
MORE THAN CSCE ITSELF WAS INVOLVED. SONNENFELDT SAID
THAT MANY ALLIES WHO EARLIER HAD STRONGLY FAVORED CSCE
HAD BECOME MORE BEARISH WHEN THEY DISCOVERED THAT DOMESTIC
OPINION WOULD BE MORE CRITICAL THAN THEY EARLIER ANTICI-
PATED. IN HIS VIEW, DECISIONS BY THE ALLIES RELATED TO
WHETHER TO CONCLUDE CSCE AT THE SUMMIT WOULD DEPEND
LARGELY ON DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. IN REPLY
TO LUNS' QUERY, SONNENFELDT SAID IT WAS NOT ESSENTIAL
THAT CSCE AGREE TO CONFERENCE FOLLOW-ON.
RUSH

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 27 JUL 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 23 MAY 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974STATE108130
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EUR/RPM:EJSTREATOR:GP
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D740129-0557
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740588/abbrzcue.tel
Line Count: 248
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <09 APR 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <26 JUL 2002 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SYG LUNS' CONVERSATION WITH THE ACTING SECRETARY
TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, (LUNS)
To: NATO INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
BELGRADE
MOSCOW
DAMASCUS
JERUSALEM
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

